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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of ) 
Catharine Armstrong, . . . 
Catharine Mayo, ) 
LEROY MAYO, • . . ) Case No • 
11090 
vs. ) 
c. HENRY K. LOGAN, ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF: ADDITIONAL CASES 
J. L. Gibson, of attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant, requests that on Page 4 at the end of 
the quote there be inserted: 
In Swan vs. Hammond 138 Mass. 45, 52 AM. 
Rep. 255, the court held that a will made by a 
woman before marriage was revoked upon marriage 
in spite of her emancipation, and in so holding 
stated: "A will made before marriage, and taking 
effect after marriage, must take effect in a very 
different manner from that in the mind of a 
testator when the will was made. The rights of 
a husband or wife must greatly modify its pro-
visions; and it can hardly be supposed that an 
urunarried person would make the same will he or 
she would make after marriage." 
By virtue of this case the will of an un-
married woman was revoked upon marriage, but the 
will of a man was not revoked until marriage and 
birth of issue. Massachusetts amended its law 
in 1892 by making the will of a man also revoked 
upon marriage by a special statute now known as 
Sec. 191-9 of the Mass. General Laws. 
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In the Matter of the Estate of ) 
Catharine Armstrong, . 
Catharine Mayo, . ) 
LEROY MAYO, 
' . . ) Case No • 11090 
vs. ) 
c. HENRY K. LOGAN, ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF: ADDITIONAL CASES 
J. L. Gibson, of attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant, requests that on page 13, after the 
first paragraph be inserted: 
See also In re Petridge Will, 47 Wash., 77, 
91 Pac. 634. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent admits the statement of facts as set forth in 
appellant's brief, and that the question at issue is whether a will 
executed by a woman who thereafter marries is revoked as a mat-
ter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMON LAW THAT THE MARRIAGE OF A WOM. 
AN REVOKED HER PRIOR EXISTING WILL WAS NEVER THE 
LAW OF UTAH. 
Article XXll, Sec. 2 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
"Real and personal estate of every female, acquired 
before marriage, and a II property to which she may after· 
wards become entitled by purchase, gift, grant, inheritance 
or devise, shall be and remain the estate and property of 
such female, and shall not be liable for the debts, obliga· 
+ions or engagements of her husband, and may be conveyed, 
devised or bequeathed by her as if she were unmarried." 
The constitutional provision is implemented by Sec. 30-2-1, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
The constitution and statutes of Utah have completely elim-
inated the common law fiction that the husband and wife are one, 
and the separate identity of the husband and wife, in al I property 
and personal rights, is the same as if they were not married. In 
the case of Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P. 2d 696, the 
court said: 
"Our Husband and Wife statutes recognize in both 
husband and wife every kind of right which they were de· 
prived of by the common law fiction that they were one, 
including the right to own, possess and manage every kind 
3 
of real and personal property, the right to sue and be 
sued for the protection of every kind of property and per-
sonal rights even as against the other. Besides the rights 
granted in the statutes above quoted, our statutes pro-
vide that the wife may be and remain the owner with the 
right of possession and control of all of her property wheth-
er acquired prior to or during coverture, which she may con-
vey, devise and bequeath as if she were unmarried and that 
such property shall not be liable for the debts of her hus-
band." 
See also: Culmer v. Wilson, 13 Utah 129, 44 P. 833. 
Appellant cites Sec. 68-3-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
relative to the adoption by the State of Utah of the common law 
of England. Sec. 68-3-2, Utah Code Annoted 1953 provides as 
follows: 
"The rule of the common law that statutes in deroga-
tion thereof are to be strictly construed has no application 
to the statutes of this state. The statutes establish the laws 
of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, 
and their provisions and all proceedings under them are 
to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of 
the statutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is any 
variance between the rules of equity and the rules of com-
mon law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity 
shall prevail." 
In the case of Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 2d 224, 342 P. 2d 94 
the Court said: 
"Section 68-3-1 only adopts the common law of Eng-
land so far 'as it is consistent with and adapted to the 
natural and physical conditions of this State and the ne-
cessities of the people thereof' and not repugnant to or 
in conflict with the Constitution or laws of the United 
States or this State. * * * it is clear that by this statute 
we adopted the common law of England only where it is 
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suitable to our conditions, morals, history and background, 
that generally we look to the system of common law and 
equity which prevails in and has been and is now being de-
veloped by the decisions of this country and that we reject 
the common law of England which is not suitable or adapted 
to our needs, morals or ideals. * * * Utah has completely 
emancipated and given a married woman the same rights 
as she would have had were she not married and the same 
rights to her separate property as her husband, both by 
our decision and statutes.***" 
See also: In re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 57, 86 P. 757. 
The single question involved in the instant case, as stated in 
Appellant's Brief, is whether the marriage of a woman revokes a 
will made by her while she was single. At common law, marriage 
revoked a woman's will previously made, and this was so because 
marriage destroyed the ambulatory character of the will, and 
without that feature the paper ceased to be a will at all. The 
marriage destroyed the ambulatory character of the will, because 
by the marriage the wife was deprived of the power to devise her 
real estate, and was prevented from bequeathing her personal 
property, except by the consent of her husband given at the time 
of the execution, and continued until the probate of the will. Her 
incapacity to make a will after marriage prevented her from al-
tering or revoking one made before marriage, and it was this in-
capacity, and nothing else, that constituted the reason upon which 
the common-law rule as to revocation by marriage was founded. 
This incapacity arose out of her husband's marital right to control 
her property. When those rights did not exist or were excluded, as 
in the execution of a power of appointment, the incapacity ceased, 
and the wife could notwithstanding her coverture make a valid 
wil I. It is obvious therefore that the rule does not and never did 
apply to a case where the reason of the rule was absent. It is pro-
vided in the Constitution of Utah that the property acquired by 
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a married woman, both before and after marriage, by purchase, 
gift, grant, inheritance or devise, shall be and remain the estate 
and property of such female, and may be conveyed, devised or be-
queathed by her as if she were unmarried. That constitutional 
provision removed every common-law disability to which a mar-
ried woman was formerly subjected with respect to making a valid 
will. She was placed by it, so far as her capacity to make a will 
is concerned, upon exactly the same footing as an unmarried 
woman. She can revoke a will already made, and she may by will 
dispose of her property against the wishes of her husband, and 
even to his entire exclusion except for his statutory claim of home-
stead. The constitution of this state clothes her, with full and abso-
lute testamentary power over her own property, no matter how 
that property was acquired, and gives to her husband no authority 
to restrict her exercise of it. If under these circumstances her mar-
riage operates to revoke her will made before marriage, the re-
vocation would be idle and utterly fruitless, because the moment 
afterwards she could confessedly make a new and valid will in 
identically the same terms as the revoked one. 
The common law rule for which appellant contends has never 
had specific or express recognition in Utah; and its introduction 
into our legal system would not be in accord with the policy of 
the state as reflected in its statutes, and in the rules of property 
and property rights which have already been settled by judicial 
determination. 
See: Roane v. Hollingshead, 25 At. 807 (Md.) 
Hastin·gs v. Day, 130 N. W. 134. (Iowa) 
Lee v. Blewett, 77 So. 147. (Miss) 
In re Lyon's Will, 71 N. W. 362. (Wisc) 
Noyes v. Southworth, 20 N. W. 891. (Mich) 
In re Hillaert's Estate, 21 N. W. 2d 155 (Mich) 
Ward's Will, 35 N. W. 731. (Wisc) 
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In re Hunt's Will, 17 Atl. 68. (Maine) 
Kelly v. Stevenson, 88 N. W. 739. (Minn) 
In re Smith's Estate, 97 P. 2d 677. (Wyo) 
Owen v. Younger, 242 S. W. 2d 895. (Tex) 
POINT II 
THE WILL OF AN UNMARRIED WOMAN IS NOT REVOKED 
BY HER MARRIAGE IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The testatrix in the instant case died without issue, and the 
Court is not called upon to determine whether the words "testator" 
and "wife" used in Sec. 74-1-24 Utah Code Annotated 1953, and 
Sections 74-1-31 and 74-1-32 comprehend the female gender. Sec· 
tion 74-1-25 supplements Sec. 74-1-1 which provides "* * * that 
a married man shall not devise away from his wife more than two· 
thirds in value of his legal or equitable estates in real property 
without her consent in writing;" and further supplements Sec. 74-4-3 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 which provides that "One-third in 
value of all the legal or equitable estates in real property pos· 
sessed by the husband at any time during the marriage, to which 
the wife has made no relinquishment of her rights, shall be set 
apart as her property in fee simple, if she survives him; * * *." A 
logical extension of appellant's argument as related to "Words 
used in one gender comprehend the other" in the construction of 
our statutes as related to husband and wife would not be in har· 
mony with the long established property rights of this state as 
fixed by statute and buttressed by judicial interpretation, and 
would be inconsistent with the manife:;t intent of the legislature. 
The Appellant cites In re Petersen's Estate, 97 Utah 324, 93 P. 
2d 445, and stresses the Court's statement therein "that the consti-
tution of this state effects equality between husband and wife inso· 
far as disposing of his or her separate property by will is con· 
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cerned;" and that the evident aim of the constitution "was to 
bring about equality, not inequality." That case makes reference 
with approval to the prior case of In re Mower's Estate, 93 Utah 
390, 73 P. 2d 967, also relied upon by Appellant, which specific-
ally recognizes that the equality contended for is not absolute. 
The Court in the Mower case cites what is now Sec. 74-1-3 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as fol lows: 
"A married woman may dispose of all her estate by 
will without the consent of her husband, and may alter or 
revoke her will in the same manner as if she were single. 
Her will must be executed and proved in the same manner 
as other wills." 
And the Court then states: 
"This is merely a freedom from marital control and 
confers no rights different from those of her husband. The 
only difference is in section 101-1-1 (now section 74-1-1 ), 
which provides a married man cannot devise', away from 
his wife, more than two-thirds of his real estate without 
her consent in writing.***." (italics supplied.) 
The contention of Appellant that "The ratio decidendi be-
hind the common-law rule was that the appearance of a new heir 
effected such a change of circumstances that a pre-existing will 
would be revoked as a matter of law," is denied by the very case 
of In re Petersen's Estate, 97 Utah 324, 93 P. 2d 445, upon which 
the Appellant heavily relies. The Court in that case, interpreting 
the constitutional provision that the estate of a female "may be 
conveyed, devised or bequeathed by her as if she were unmarried," 
said: 
"It is evident, however, that the very wording of the 
constitutional provision is such as to evidence an intent (1) 
to do away with Jhe common law doctrines under which 
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there was created by law an estate in the husband as an in-
cident to marriage; and (2) so freeing it from such interest 
of the husband, give to the wife the right to dispose of it. 
At common law, the birth of a child gave rise to an obliga-
tion to provide for its care and support, at least during its minor-
ity, and endowed the child with a moral right under ordinary cir-
cumstances to expect recognition in the distribution of its parent's 
estate. The wife was under no common law obligation to support 
her husband, and the laws of Utah, Sections 74-1-1 and 74-4-6 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, have provided for each a fixed share in 
the other's estate which cannot be taken away or diminished by 
will or other act of his or her spouse. Subject to that right, each 
may, by will fully dispose of all the rest of his or her estate to 
others. See: Hastings v. Day, 130 N. W. 134. 
Under the common law it was not, upon the marriage of a 
woman, the appearance of a new heir that automatically revoked 
her will-it was not the marriage itself, but was her testamentary 
incapacity incident to her marriage which was the destroying pow-
er which worked that result, for by the common law such result 
could be avoided, and testamentary capacity preserved, by an an-
tenuptial agreement reserving to her the power to dispose of her 
separate property as if sole. Therefore, when, in Utah, by constitu-
tional and statutory provision, women were given the testamentary 
capacity to devise or bequeath their estate as if they were un-
married, the common law rule was repealed, and their testamen· 
tary capacity was preserved to them exactly as an antenuptial 
agreement would have done at common law. If the subsequent mar-
riage of a woman does not revoke her will where her testamentary 
capacity is reserved to her by an antenuptial agreement, neces-
sarily the same result fol lows when the constitution and statute 
expressly continues such capacity subject to the statutory reserva-
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tions imposed by the legislature. See: Kelly v. Stevenson, 88 N. W. 
739. 
In connection with the issue with which we are confronted in 
the instant case, it must be recognized that there are numerous 
statutory variations controlling the subject within the various states. 
It is noted, for example, that in the cases of Ellis vs. Darden·, 12 S. 
E. 652, and Owens v. Haines, 199 Penn. 137, 48 Atl. 859, cited by 
Appellant, the statutes provided in substance that when a person 
makes a will and afterward marries or has a child not provided 
for in such will, as distinguished from the Utah statute which pro-
vides "if after making a wil I the testator marries and has issue;" 
and as a result of such statutory variations there are naturally 
many unharmonious judicial interpretations and opinions. 
POINT Ill 
TESTACY RATHER THAN INTESTACY PREFERRED; IM-
PLIED REVOCATIONS RESTRICTED BY STATUTE. 
The statutes of Utah have codified the general rule that it 
is the policy of the law to indulge every legal presumption in fav-
or of the validity of a wil I. 
Sec. 74-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides: 
"A will is to be construed according to the intention of 
the testator. Where his intention can not have effect to its 
full extent, it must have effect as far as possible." 
Sec. 74-2-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides: 
"The words of a will are to receive an interpretation 
which will give to every expression some effect rather than 
one which will render any of the expressions inoperative." 
Sec. 74-2-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides: 
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"Of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be 
preferred which will prevent a total intestacy." 
The exclusive methods of revoking a will in this state are set 
forth in Sec. 74-1-19, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as follows: 
"Except in the cases in this chapter mentioned, no 
written will, nor any part thereof, can be revoked or altered 
otherwise than: 
(I) By a written will, or other writing of the testator de. 
daring such revocation or alteration executed with the 
same formalities with which a will should be executed 
by such testator; or, 
(2) By being burned, torn, cancelled, obliterated or de· 
stroyed, with the intent and for the purpose of revok. 
ing the same, by the testator himself or by some per· 
son in his presence and by his direction." 
None of the provisions in Chapter I on the Execution and Re-
vocation of Wills, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provide that the 
will of an unmarried woman is presumed to be revoked under any 
circumstances. The privilege of disposing of one's property by will 
is not a natural right but depends upon positive law, and may 
properly be regulated and restricted by the legislature; and the 
mode of its execution, the manner of its revocation, and the class 
of person who may make a will, and what changes in the personal 
status of such persons after its execution shall operate as a revoca· 
tion or be sufficient reasons for denying probate, are all matters 
within and committed to legislative competency. In re: Little's 22 
Utah 204, 61 Pac. 899; In re: Mower's Estate 93 Utah 390, 73 P. 
2d 967. Counsel for the appellant points out that the Utah legis-
lature enacted into statute the common law on revocation of a 
man's will. If the Utah legislature had intended to adopt the com· 
mon law that the will of an unmarried woman was revoked upon 
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her marriage, the legislature would have so provided. !n the con-
struction of Sec. 74-1-25, Utah Code Annotated 1953, no obtru-
sion to include a person not clearly comprehended therein can be 
recognized, as such statute is in derogation of the general power 
to make a will, is in the nature of an exception thereto, and must 
be accorded a strict construction. In re: Comassi's Estate, 40 Pac. 
15; Owen v. Younger, 242 S. W. 2d 895. 
The effect of the provisions of Sec. 74-1-19, Utah Code An-
notated 1953, is to do away with the doctrine of implied revo-
cation except in those cases expressly and succinctly excepted by 
legislative enactment. 
The appellant places great reliance upon the word "testator" 
as the same is used throughout Title 74, Chapters I, 2 and 3, 
Wills & Succession, Utah Code Annotated 1953 - in fact the 
word "testator" is employed in excess of fifty times, and the 
word "testatrix" - a female testator - does not appear once. 
However, only in Sections 74-1-24 and 74-1-25 is the intended sex 
of the word "testator" made explicit, and its gender expressly con-
fined to the male as destinguished from the female, in that these 
sections of the statute make express reference to the wife as the 
intended survivor of the testator. As hereinbefore stated, we are 
not in this case confronted with the necessity of placing an inter-
pretation on the legislative intent as related to Section 74-1-24, 
for there was no issue born of the marriage of decedent and the 
appellant. As to Section 74-1-25, it supplements and relates to 
Section 74-1-1 which provides "that a married man shall not de-
vise away from his wife more than two-third in value of his legal 
and equitable estates in real property without her consent in writ-
ing." To interpret Section 74-1-25 as meaning both sexes would be 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature. It has been 
consistently held that where the language of a statute is plain and 
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conveys definite, sensible meaning, the court must enforce it ac-
cording to the obvious meaning of the words employed. Evans v. 
Reiser, 78 Utah 253, 2 P. 2d 615; Riches v. Hadlock, 80 Utah 265, 
15 P. 2d 283; Salt Lake Union Stock Yards v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 93 Utah 166, 71 P. 2d 538; In re Stevens' Estate, 102 Utah 
255, 130 P. 2d 85. 
If the will of the testatrix, executed while she was an unmar-
ried woman, was revoked by her marriage, she could have, the day 
following her marriage, made an identical will which would only 
have been subject to her husband's right of homestead, unless we 
are, without reservation, to accept appellant's proposed statutory 
construction and say that the words "married man" in Section 74-
1-1 comprehend the words "married woman," and there by upset a 
statutory provision of over half a century standing in this state so 
as to place men and woman on exactly the same footing contend-
ed for by appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
A determination by the court that the decedent's will, made 
while she was single, was not revoked by her marriage, but that 
there is reserved to her husband a homestead, will be in harmony 
with In re Petersen's Estate, 97 Utah 324, 93 P. 2d 445; the relative 
rights of men and women, and the constitution and laws of this 
state. The decision of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. J. SWEETRING 
Attorney for Respondent 
23 South Carbon Avenue 
Price, Utah 
--
